Introduction
The nation’s highest court has lowered the bar for involuntarily transferred employees to make the necessary showing of harm to make out a case of Title VII employment discrimination. On April 17, 2024, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, No. 22-193, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 1816 vacated the Eighth Circuit’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s case. In so doing, the Court rejected a legal standard that some Circuit Courts have applied to discrimination cases and held instead that under Title VII, a plaintiff claiming discrimination need not show that the harm suffered was “significant,” but rather must only show that the transfer brought about “some harm.”
Background
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of such individual’s sex (among other protected characteristics). Before the Muldrow decision, some federal appeals circuits required that a Title VII plaintiff demonstrate “significant,” “material,” or “serious” injury to succeed on his or her claim. Now, the Muldrow decision clarifies the bounds of what constitutes an adverse employment action under Title VII.
Facts of the Case and the Court’s Opinion
Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow was a female Sergeant in the St. Louis Police Department’s specialized Intelligence Division. In 2017, the Division’s commander asked to transfer Muldrow to another division and replaced her with a male police officer. Muldrow was indeed reassigned, and while she received the same pay as she had in the Intelligence Division, her responsibilities, perks, and work schedule were negatively impacted. The transfer reduced her job responsibilities, and she no longer worked alongside high-ranking officials as a result. Instead, she had to supervise the daily patrol of neighborhood officers. She also lost access to a take-home vehicle and was given an inconsistent, rotating work schedule that included weekend shifts. Muldrow also alleged that the transfer was to a less prestigious position, thus harming her career prospects.
Muldrow sued the City under Title VII, challenging her transfer on the grounds that she was a woman and harmed by the changes in her responsibilities, perks, and work schedule. The District Court granted summary judgment for the city, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow could not show a “materially significant disadvantage” that resulted from the transfer.
The Supreme Court, however, vacated the Eighth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that “[a]n employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.” These ruling changes the legal standard for those Circuit Courts that previously required Title VII plaintiffs to show significant, material, or serious injury. Thus, for Muldrow, “[t]he transfer must have left her worse off, but need not have left her significantly so. And Muldrow’s allegations, if properly preserved and supported, meet that test with room to spare.”
Looking Forward
While the Supreme Court’s ruling in Muldrow was specific to the involuntary job transfer that was at issue in that case, the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to cases involving alleged discrimination in other terms and conditions of employment, effectively lowering the bar for a plaintiff to make the crucial showing of an adverse employment action in a Title VII case. Given this lighter burden, we expect that employers and the federal courts will see an uptick in the number of such cases. As always, Bressler stands ready to answer your questions regarding this decision and its implications for your business.